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Article 6

THE JURY ROOM
By

BRUCE

W. BELDiNc*

"If jurors are conscious that they will be subjected to interrogation or searchinghostile inquiry as to what occurred in the jury room
and why, they are almost inescapably influenced to some extent by
that anticipatedannoyance. The courts will not permit that potential
influence to invade the jury room. He who makes studied inquiries
of jurors as to what occurred there acts at his peril, lest he be held as
acting in obstruction of the administration of justice."'
COURTS HAVE long looked with disfavor on attempts by lawyers,
court officers, adverse parties, students or analysts of jury systems, and
bystanders to discover what transpired during a jury's deliberations.
However, information as to events occurring during the jury's deliberations may be important and desirable for a number of reasons;
inter alia, information on which to base a motion for new trial on
grounds of jury misconduct; observing jury's reaction to and comprehension of court's instructions; seeing how individual jurors conduct
themselves to determine effectiveness of attorney's panel selection and
voir dire questioning; studying human behavior as applied to jury
system; and determining reactions to certain techniques of argument.

I. To Impeach Verdict
Normally, proof of prejudicial misconduct of the jury is adequate
ground for setting aside the verdict. 2 But proof is usually difficult to
obtain, especially since most courts follow Lord Mansfield's rule that
a juror may not testify as to misconduct of the jury during its deliberations, 3 or as stated in a leading American case, "a juror cannot impeach
his own verdict."4 Hence, interested parties have been forced to their
ingenuity to devise ways to discover this information.
Wigmore suggests that since Lord Mansfield's rule requires proof
of misconduct to depend solely on testimony of "some person having
seen the transaction through a window or by some other means," 5 a
bailiff or other court officer, who may have been present at the jury's
deliberations, may prove their misconduct, even though in so doing
he is committing a gross breach of duty; but an actual participant in
the misconduct (juror himself) may not testify, thereby excluding the
*Member, Second Year class.
'Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d
2 CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 657.
3 Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11 (K.B.
4 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264,
5 Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11 (K.B.

739, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1948).
1785).
267 (1915).
1785).
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better testimony, and possibly tempting the parties to bribe the bailiff.6
However, the courts have precluded "unauthorized invasions"7 into the
privacy of the jury and made misconduct of such officers which may
be prejudicial to the jury's deliberations grounds for a new trial."
These decisions seem primarily intended to preserve the sanctity of
the jury room, but they also serve to limit the sources of information

regarding the jury's deliberations, leaving the jurors themselves as the
main source of such information.
One of the main reasons for the persistence of Lord Mansfield's rule
is to protect jurors from fear of having their course of deliberations
publicized. 9 Therefore, it seems to follow that there is a correlation

between exclusion of juror testimony and any post-trial interrogation
of jurors. 10 Interrogation of jurors (extra-judicially) after trial, in order

to discover the required proof of misconduct, has not only been held
by the American Bar Association to be unethical," but is generally
frowned upon by the courts. For example, in Northern Pac. Ry. v.

Mely,' 2 it was said, 'We do hold for future guidance that it is improper

and unethical for lawyers, court attach6s, or judges in a particular case

to make public the transactions in the jury room or to interview jurors
to discover what was the course of deliberation of a trial jury." 3
It is suggested that such a broad statement could be tempered
along the lines of the holding in Primm v. Continental Cas. Co.,' 4
where again disfavor with post-trial juror interrogation was shown, but
was qualified by saying "without prior permission of the court, to be
granted only upon good cause being shown." 15 This seems to embody
all the safeguards necessary to protect the sanctity of the jury room,

plus allowing certain questioning, but at the court's discretion. This
procedure seems to preclude indiscriminate advances at jurors by attorneys, but would allow interrogation upon a court's determination
that good cause existed.
6 8 WiGmonE, EvIDENcE § 2353 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

7 Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).
8 66 CJ.S. New Trial § 58c at 180 (1950).
9 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
10 United States v. 120,000 Acres of Land, 52 F. Supp. 212, 213 (D.C. 1943), stated
the importance of adherence to the rule of excluding juror testimony in impeachment of
verdict, and stated, "An equal respect for the verdict after rendition in so far as any jury
room deliberations is necessary."
"1A.B.A., Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 23: "A lawyer must never converse
privately with jurors about the case ..
" The A.B.A. Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, in opinion 209 (1947), ruled that it is professionally improper and unethical ". . . for a lawyer to interview, after verdict, jurymen who were on the panel as
to what took place in the jury room and as to what the salient points were which caused
the jury to arrive at a given verdict."
12 219 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1954).
Is Id. at 202.
14 143 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. La. 1956).
'DId. at 127.
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It has been suggested that although courts look with disfavor on
post-trial interrogations by attorneys, they "fail to make a distinction
between inquiry for impeachment of verdict and inquiry for trial tactics,""o and that the latter should be allowed. The distinction is based
on the grounds that since neither testimony of jurors nor of third persons who talked to the jurors is admissible to impeach the verdict, such
inquiry is futile; whereas to inquire as to the effectiveness of his arguments in order to improve his trial tactics would be less objectionable
since only for the attorney's personal benefit. Perhaps this is a valid
distinction, but it must be noted that if such interrogation were to be
allowed, it must be supervised, for to require jurors to discern between
questions bordering on verdict-impeachment and those of tactical benefit to counsel is a fine line to be drawn by a lay juror.
The Ohio Supreme Court has relaxed the rule prohibiting impeachment of verdict by jurors to the extent of permitting jurors to testify
concerning misconduct of third parties, such as court officers.'- Other
courts have used this, or similar extensions of the rule: Mattox v.
United States 8 allowed a juryman to testify as to facts regarding the
existence of extraneous influence; Southern Pac. Ry. v. Klingel9 held
similarly regarding outside influence such as bribes; United States v.
120,000 Acres of Land20 held "testimony as to outside acts, declarations, or information will be heard." California recognizes two exceptions to the general rule that affidavits of jurors may not be used to
impeach a verdict: to show verdict was arrived at by chance, 21 and
that bias or disqualification of a juror was concealed by false answers
22
on voir dire.
Hence, it is apparent that certain deviations are permitted from
Lord Mansfield's rule, i.e., not all juror testimony in impeachment of
verdict is excluded. Nevertheless, assuming the correlation between
Lord Mansfield's rule and post-trial interrogation, such deviations may
be quite important when an attorney seeks permission to question a
juror. If the attorney can assert suspicion of interference by an outside
source, or false answers on voir dire, or verdict obtained by chance, the
court may weigh this more heavily since such testimony would be ad' 6Note, 10 OKLA. L. REv. 174, 176 (1957).
17See Note, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 262 (1949), but the article notes that this is a minority contention, that McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915), still represents the majority
view.

146 U.S. 140 (1892).
19 65 F.2d 85 (10th Cir. 1933).
2052 F. Supp. 212, 213 (D.C. 1943).
1,

21 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.

§ 657.

22 Kollert v. Cundiff, 50 Cal. 2d 768, 329 P.2d 897 (1958). Note, however, that in
California misconduct of a juror is grounds for a new trial only if prejudice results therefrom. Forrest v. Pickwick Stages System, 101 Cal. App. 426, 433, 281 Pac. 723, 725,
(1929).
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missible by a juror. Permission may be denied more readily if the evidence sought would not be later admissible.
Sentiment toward relaxation of Lord Mansfield's rule is noted in
the dissent to Kollert v. Cundiff23 by Carter, J., who advocates rejection
of the doctrine that a juror's affidavit cannot be used to impeach his
verdict, and also in the Model Code of Evidence24 and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence.25 Each seems to suggest a more liberal view, allowing juror testimony regarding conditions bearing on the verdict.
Therefore, if certain relevant juror testimony is considered admissible,
perhaps a relaxation of rules regarding post-trial inquiries will follow.
A trial judge may be more liberal in allowing juror interrogation if testimony may be received regarding relevant conditions; this should
confine areas of inquiry sufficiently to preclude "fishing expedition"
type inquiries.

II. Recording Jury Deliberations
What better way is there to study the operation of the jury system
-its strength and weakness-than to actually "eavesdrop" on a jury's
deliberations? This was the same question in the minds of the participants in the University of Chicago's Jury Research Project (sponsored
by the Ford Foundation) when they actually recorded the deliberations of six petit juries. Perhaps this would be unknown to this date
except to the participants if part of one of the deliberations had not
been played back to a conference of 10th Judicial Circuit Judges at
Estes Park, Colorado in July 1955. This aroused such a furor as to
cause the leaders of the project to be brought before a congressional
committee hearing cases regarding the internal security of the United
States, 26 and to result in the legislation noted below.
Today federal law imposes a fine of one thousand dollars or a year
in prison, or both, upon any person "recording, listening to, or observ2
ing proceedings of grand or petit juries while deliberating or voting." 7
The California Penal Code makes the same a misdemeanor.28
The practice of recording jury proceedings is condemned not only
by legislation, but by judicial decisions and legal writers. Wigmore
states that, "the communications originate in a confidence of secrecy;
this confidence is essential to the due attainment of the jury's constitutional purpose; the relation of juror is clearly entitled to the highest
23
24

50 Cal. 2d 768, 774, 329 P.2d 897, 901 (1958) (dissent).
MODEL CODE

OF EVIDENCE

rule 301, comment a (1942) permits "juror to testify

to every relevant matter except his mental processes and the effect which any act or event

had on
his mental operations with reference to the verdict."
25
UNFoRM RuLEs OF EViDENCE rules 41, 44 (1952).
26
Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 1955).
27 18 U.S.C.A. § 1508 (1956).
28
CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 167, 891.
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consideration and the most careful protection; and the injury from disclosure would certainly overbalance the benefits thereby gained."29
Cardozo aptly stated, in Clark v. United States, 30 "freedom of debate
might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were
made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world." In Remmer v. United States31 the court stated:
"A juror must feel free to exercise his function without the F.B.I. or
anyone else looking over his shoulder. The integrity of jury proceedings must not be jeopardized by unauthorized invasions."'32 It is true
that the University of Chicago committee purported to obtain the
consent of court and counsel prior to recording any deliberations, 3 3 but
court and counsel may not consent away one of the basic principles of
our jury system. Freedom of discussion is basic to jury proceedings,
and this can only be insured by maintaining secrecy. 34 Therefore, it
seems that in the constant quest for information as to what took place
in the jury room, actual recording exceeds all acceptable limits.
However, in conclusion, it is suggested that the demand for information as to what occurred during deliberation may be satisfactorily
and safely satisfied by vesting in the court a discretion as to allowing
post-trial interrogation, as suggested in the Primm case, supra. This
would relax the present rules regarding post-trial interrogation, and
would parallel what appears to be a relaxation of Lord Mansfield's rule,
reflecting a more liberal view by the courts as to the admissibility of
certain testimony by jurors-a desirable result.
29 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§ 2346, at 678 (McNaugbton rev. 1961).

30 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).

31347 U.S. 227 (1954).
32 Id. at 229.
33 Hearings, supra note 26.
34 Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).

